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MISSISSIPPI CLASS ACTIONS AND THE INEVITABILITY OF
MASS AGGREGATE LITIGATION
Howard M. Erichson*
INTRODUCTION
It's not about whether there will be mass aggregate litigation, but how.
As long as the economy features mass marketing, mass employment,
mass entertainment, mass transportation, mass production of goods, and
mass provision of services, disputes will arise in which a mass of claimants
seek relief from a common defendant or set of defendants. Lawyers on
both sides naturally handle such matters collectively rather than individu-
ally. With or without the judicial imprimatur of class certification, multi-
claimant disputes routinely are litigated and resolved on a collective basis.
The real question is not whether there will be mass litigation, but whether
mass litigation will be subject to formal procedural safeguards or will in-
stead proceed without clearly defined ethical duties or meaningful judicial
supervision.
Mississippi does not permit class actions Yet Mississippi has been a
hotbed of mass litigation, particularly mass tort litigation. Although recent
tort reform legislation has reduced the amount of mass litigation in Missis-
sippi by rendering the state's courts less appealing to plaintiffs, for a num-
ber of years Mississippi saw a tremendous concentration of large-scale
litigation. How is it possible that the one state that prohibits class actions
was an undisputed leader in mass aggregate litigation? The answer reveals
much about mass dispute resolution, and shows why Mississippi ought to
* Professor, Seton Hall Law School. The author thanks Paul Rosenthal for his excellent
research assistance. He appreciates the helpful comments of the participants in the Mississippi College
Law Review symposium and in a faculty workshop at Vanderbilt Law School.
1. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 23 (omitted), cmt. See also Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866
So. 2d 1092, 1102 n.8 (Miss. 2004) (Graves, J., concurring) (citing Richard T. Phillips, Class Action &
Joinder in Mississippi, 71 Miss. L.J. 447, 453 (2001), for the proposition that Mississippi is the sole state
in the United States that does not permit class actions, and noting that Virginia, which lacks a class
action rule, permits class actions in equity, and subsequent to the publication of Phillips' article, New
Hampshire recently adopted a class action rule). Despite some prior uses of the "bill of peace" that
resembled equitable class actions, see Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Deakle, 661 So. 2d 188, 191-93
(Miss. 1995), the Mississippi Supreme Court has made it clear that not only are class actions unavailable
under the rules of civil procedure, they are also unavailable in equity. See USF&G Ins. Co. v. Walls,
No. 2002-IA-00185-SCT, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 657, at *3 (Miss. June 10, 2004) ("We granted USF&G's
petition for interlocutory appeal, see M.R.A.P. 5, which asks one question: does Mississippi recognize'equitable class actions' in chancery, despite an omission of Rule 23 from our Rules of Civil Procedure?
After a review of the history of the law, we answer that question in the negative."); Am. Bankers Ins.
Co. of Fla. v. Booth, 830 So. 2d 1205 (2002) ("[T]he rule is that Mississippi does not permit class actions,
even equitable class actions in chancery court.").
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permit representative litigation in the form of class actions. Mississippi de-
clined to adopt a class action rule in order to avoid the burdens, controver-
sies, and complexities of mass aggregate litigation, but mass aggregate
litigation happened anyway.
When the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1981, modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
it declined to adopt Rule 23 on class actions. The court saw the strong
negative reactions that class actions engendered in some observers, and
was concerned that class actions would be unmanageable for the Missis-
sippi courts. The court explained its reasoning in an official comment:
Class action practice is not being introduced into Mis-
sissippi trial courts at this time.
Few procedural devices have been the subject of more
widespread criticism and more sustained attack - and
equally spirited defense - than practice under Federal Rule
23 and its state counterparts. The dissatisfaction focuses
primarily on Rule 23(b)(3), which permits suits on the part
of persons whose only connection is that one or more com-
mon issues characterize their position in relation to an ad-
verse party.
In 1976 the American Bar Association, the Conference
of Chief Justices, and the Judicial Conference of the United
States jointly sponsored the National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice. Class action practice was one of the topics con-
sidered by the National Conference (often referred to as the
"Pound Conference," in deference to Roscoe Pound and his
landmark address in 1906 entitled "The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice") and re-
ferred to the ABA for follow-up study and action.
Aside from general proposals to provide jurisdictional
"floors" and "ceilings" to regulate the size of class actions,
greater judicial control over awards of attorneys' fees, and
replacing the "opt-out" provisions with "opt-in" require-
ments, no meaningful reforms have as yet been developed
to render class action practice a more manageable tool.2
The court apparently believed that by omitting class actions from its proce-
dural repertoire, the Mississippi judicial system could avoid "widespread
criticism" and "sustained attack." It apparently believed, as well, that the
class action constitutes a less "manageable tool" than its alternatives.
This article explains why Mississippi needs a class action rule, by com-
paring the class action to its realistic alternatives. Part I explores how mass
2. Miss. R. Civ. P. 23 (omitted), cmt. (citations omitted).
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aggregate litigation occurs in the absence of a class action rule. By examin-
ing the business of mass litigation and by reviewing the Mississippi experi-
ence, it shows that a state does not avoid mass litigation by prohibiting class
actions. Rather, a prohibition on class actions channels mass disputes into
other modes of formal and informal aggregate dispute resolution. Part 1I
explains why, in some cases, class actions function better than other forms
of aggregate litigation. Part III addresses two potential objections to a Mis-
sissippi class action rule, both of which involve the capacity of the court
system to handle class actions, and concludes that neither objection justifies
rejection of a class action rule.
I. MASS AGGREGATE LITIGATION WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS
Too often, observers use the term "class action" as though it were sy-
nonymous with "mass aggregate litigation."3 Overbroad use of the term"class action" makes it easy to lose sight not only of how class actions differ
from other processes for aggregate litigation, but also of what class actions
have in common with those other mechanisms. Class actions, as represen-
tative litigation with heightened judicial supervision, differ from other
forms of aggregate litigation. These differences create not only risks, but
also opportunities for superior resolutions of mass litigation, which this ar-
ticle will address in Part II. 4 First, however, it is necessary to focus on what
class actions and other processes have in common - their ability to pull
together related claims for purposes of collective dispute resolution - to
understand the extent to which mass aggregate litigation occurs even in the
absence of class actions.
A. The Business of Mass Litigation
The business of mass litigation, on both the plaintiff side and the de-
fense side, drives lawyers to handle mass disputes on a collective rather
than individual basis. Market forces, fee incentives, and the desire to liti-
gate at a high level discourage lawyers from treating widespread disputes
on an individual basis.
As I have described at greater length elsewhere, plaintiffs' law firms in
mass torts or mass consumer litigation often represent hundreds or
thousands of individual clients with similar claims,5 and given the nature of
mass disputes, such mass representation makes sense as a business strategy
3. Deborah Hensler puts it this way: "The term 'class action is sometimes treated as if it were
synonymous with 'large scale litigation' or 'mass torts.' By 'large scale litigation,' I mean litigation
comprising large numbers of like claims - hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, or even more -
pursued more or less collectively in what this conference's organizers have termed 'group litigation."'
Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large
Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & Ir'L L. 179, 181 (2001).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 65-103.
5. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in
Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 530-43 (describing various forms of
non-class collective representation, including mass representation by a single firm).
20051
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for plaintiffs' firms.6 Well-established advertising and referral networks fa-
cilitate such mass collective representation.7 Likewise, law firm specializa-
tion in particular mass litigation enables firms to accumulate large numbers
of clients with related claims.8 In some cases, preexisting groups such as
unions and homeowners' associations facilitate collective representation.
It makes business sense for plaintiffs' lawyers to take a collective ap-
proach when representing clients whose claims form part of a dispute in-
volving many similarly situated claimants. Mass torts and other complex
litigation require a significant investment if they are to be litigated effec-
tively. To take large-scale discovery, hire leading experts, brief complex
issues, and prepare for trial or settlement, plaintiffs' counsel must invest a
large amount of time and money. One reason plaintiffs' counsel must in-
vest so heavily in mass litigation is to level the field with defendants who
can be expected to invest in the litigation in proportion to its aggregate
stakes.9 To justify the investment required to litigate such claims effec-
tively, the business strategy of many plaintiffs' firms is to represent as many
similarly situated clients as possible. By signing up large numbers of cli-
ents, a firm reduces the per-plaintiff cost of litigating, and maximizes its
return on sunk costs.
Defendants' lawyers similarly approach mass disputes on a collective
basis. When multiple plaintiffs assert claims against a defendant, that de-
fendant views the stakes of the litigation - and thus the appropriate invest-
ment in defending against the claims - in terms of the aggregate stakes.
Expert witnesses, for example, are retained with the expectation that their
work can be used in numerous cases, which makes it economically viable
for defendants to spend the time and money to find and retain experts who
are leaders in their fields and whose testimony will be maximally beneficial
for the defense. Similarly, in conducting factual investigation, handling
complex legal issues, or preparing for trial, defendants in mass litigation
benefit from the economies of scale that come from using the same work to
solidify their defense against numerous claims. Defendants routinely or-
ganize their defense in mass litigation with a hub-and-spoke structure in
which national counsel oversee the defense and handle common issues
while regional or local counsel handle some of the day-to-day management
of specific cases.1"
If a defendant expects that mass liability is a serious risk, the defen-
dant at some point can be expected to shift its strategy from defending
absolutely against liability to seeking reasonable negotiated resolutions.
6. See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1769 (2005).
7. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 532-39.
8. See id.
9. See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without
Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 27-30.
10. For a more detailed account of the similarity between the hub-and-spoke structures on the
plaintiffs' and defense sides, see Mitchell Lowenthal & Howard Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation,
Prior-Action Depositions, and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 989 (1995).
[VOL. 24:285
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At that point, particularly if the litigation has matured sufficiently for out-
comes to be relatively predictable and for claims values to be stable,"' de-
fendants tend to prefer broadly inclusive resolutions. The search for
inclusive resolutions is driven, in part, by the financial markets' demand
that business defendants contain their liability risk.12 As defense lawyer
Andrew Berry has explained, "a mass tort defendant which accurately as-
sesses its future liabilities by using an aggregated legal proceeding to 'cap-
ture' a large number of claimants makes Wall Street happy."13 The capital
markets value certainty and thus create an incentive for businesses to con-
tain their liability risks by seeking broadly inclusive resolutions. A broad
resolution has value in the capital markets because it allows a defendant to
put the dispute behind it, get on with business, and quantify the remaining
risk.
Because plaintiffs' lawyers and defense lawyers both approach mass
litigation on a collective basis, and because many defendants favor inclu-
sive resolutions, the endgame for much mass litigation is a series of aggre-
gate settlements.14 In an aggregate settlement, the claims of multiple
plaintiffs are resolved as part of a broader deal. They require the informed
consent of each participating client after disclosure of the full scope of the
deal.15 Aggregate settlements take a variety of forms, ranging from lump
sum package deals to matrix settlements with complex claims mecha-
nisms. 6 Defendants often favor aggregate settlements because such deals
give them greater peace than individual settlements. Plaintiffs' lawyers
often prefer aggregate settlements not only because such settlements re-
solve the claims of a large number of clients, but also because they some-
times allows plaintiffs to get higher amounts from defendants willing to pay
a premium for a broader resolution. Moreover, a lawyer for a large group
of plaintiffs may be able to obtain settlements for clients with weaker
claims by negotiating a settlement that includes stronger claims. The par-
ticular incentives vary from case to case, and the modes of aggregate litiga-
tion and the structures of aggregate settlements vary as well. My point is
not that every mass dispute is resolved the same way, but rather that even
11. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659 (1989).
12. See Erichson, supra note 6.
13. Andrew T. Berry, Comments on Aggregation: Some Unintended Consequences of Aggregative
Disposition Procedures, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 920, 921 (2001).
14. Fred Misko, Jr., A Professional Responsibility Checklist for the Class Action and Mass Tort
Practitioner 4 (Feb. 6, 1998) ("The mass tort bar prefers aggregate settlements.") (unpublished work
submitted for the University of Texas School of Law's Ethics and Mass Torts Symposium, on file with
the Mississippi College School of Law Review), available at http://www.misko.com/library/Ethics.pdf.
15. See Miss. R. PROF'L CONDUCr 1.8(g):
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate
settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement
as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after consultation, including
disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participa-
tion of each person in the settlement.
16. See Erichson, supra note 6.
2005]
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without class actions, the business of mass litigation drives lawyers and par-
ties to address the litigation on a collective basis, and to pursue negotiated
resolutions that link the settlements of related claims.'7
B. Non-Class Aggregate Litigation
Multi-party dispute resolution occurs in many forms. In both state and
federal courts, a wide variety of formal procedural mechanisms are availa-
ble for joining or gathering related claims.'" In addition, lawyers in mass
litigation often informally aggregate the claims by representing many simi-
larly situated clients and by coordinating their efforts with other lawyers.
1. Formal Aggregation
Formal aggregation methods can be used for small-scale aggregation,
such as joining an additional plaintiff or defendant to a two-party lawsuit,
or for much larger aggregation. First and most importantly, the rule on
permissive party joinder allows pleadings that aggregate claims of multiple
plaintiffs and/or claims against multiple defendants.' 9 For permissive party
joinder under Rule 20, the claims must arise out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and the claims must
involve a common question of law or fact.2" Most joinder is permissive, but
in a narrow band of cases, the compulsory party joinder rule requires that
certain parties be joined in the action.2 ' After an action is commenced,
non-parties may seek to intervene in the action either as of right 22 or by
permissive intervention.23
Separately filed actions can be consolidated by the court, resulting in
aggregate litigation.24 Beyond case-by-case consolidation, some states pro-
vide for statewide consolidation or centralization of all cases pertaining to a
17. Samuel Issacharoff and John Witt have taken this idea even further, showing that even those
claims that are not ordinarily perceived as "mass litigation" - auto accident litigation, for example -
nonetheless are settled by insurance adjusters and other repeat players in ways that can be understood
as aggregate settlements. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004).
18. See Hensler, supra note 3, at 182:
In fact, in the United States, there are a variety of devices for pursuing large-scale litigation
other than the class action, including multi-district litigation, formal consolidation, informal
aggregation, and bankruptcy. Some of these devices have been established by statute, some
by court rule, and some are the products of creative management by judges and lawyers.
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20; Miss. R. Civ. P. 20. See also Pat H. Scanlon, Parties, in Mississipi
CIvIL PROCEDURE § 6:19 (Jeffrey Jackson ed., 2004) ("Suppose a truck runs into a school bus and hurts
a number of persons. All of the bus passengers suffering personal injuries or property damage may join
as plaintiffs in a single action under Rule 20, even though their respective claims are several rather than
joint.").
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a); Miss. R. Civ. P. 20(a). The Mississippi Supreme Court in 2004
changed course from a very liberal interpretation of Rule 20 to a more restrictive interpretation. See
infra text accompanying rules 48-51.
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Miss. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a); Miss. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b); Miss. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a); Miss. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
[VOL. 24:285
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particular mass tort or other mass litigation,25 just as the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation is empowered to transfer related federal court cases
to a single federal district court for coordinated pretrial handling.26
2. Informal Aggregation
In addition to these formal procedural mechanisms for aggregation,
informal channels have the effect of pulling claims together as well. A sin-
gle lawyer or law firm may represent numerous clients with related claims
against a defendant or group of defendants. For some lawyers, advertising
and referral networks result in "inventories" of hundreds or thousands of
similarly situated clients. Such mass collective representation allows the
lawyers to handle the claims on a collective basis - both in litigation and in
settlement negotiations - regardless of whether the claims are formally ag-
gregated through any judicial mechanism such as class action, party joinder,
or consolidation.27
When multiple lawyers or law firms represent clients with related
claims, the attorneys may coordinate their efforts.28 Such coordination
among counsel, sometimes assisted by affiliations such as Association of
Trial Lawyers of America litigation groups, achieves informal aggregation
much like mass collective representation by a single firm. By pooling re-
sources and sharing information, multiple firms achieve some of the econo-
mies of scale that a single firm obtains through mass collective
representation. In some cases, coordinating firms jointly negotiate an ag-
gregate settlement with a defendant on behalf of their clients.
In sum, litigation becomes aggregated in many ways. In addition to
various mechanisms for formal aggregation, lawyers handle related claims
on an aggregate basis through mass collective representation or through
informal aggregation by coordinating counsel.
C. The Mississippi Experience: Mass Litigation Without Class Actions
For proof that mass litigation occurs even in the absence of class ac-
tions, one need look no further than Mississippi. Mississippi courts have
handled cases in which hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs have joined
their claims in a single action.29 Observers have noted that the Mississippi
courts, for a number of years, used the permissive joinder rule to allow
25. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 2005); N.J. CT. R. 4:38; PA. R. Civ. P. 213,213.1.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (authorizing multidistrict litigation ("MDL") transfer in the fed-
eral courts). Certain aspects of formal aggregation - notably bankruptcy and MDL - occur only in the
federal courts, but these mechanisms affect state court actions as well. Bankruptcy stays litigation in-
cluding cases in state court, and enables the court to gather claims against the debtor. MDL, by affect-
ing the overall course of a mass litigation, often has a significant impact on state court claims. On the
relationship of MDL to state court claims, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 20.3,
22.4 (2004); William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in
State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992).
27. See Erichson, supra note 5.
28. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Co-
ordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000).
29. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 455.
2005]
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mass litigation of the same scope as class actions,30 and sometimes to allow
mass litigation that would not have satisfied the requirements for class cer-
tification elsewhere. One Mississippi lawyer commented in 2002 that "in
Mississippi today, plaintiffs can aggregate claims that would not be aggre-
gated anywhere else in the country, either under joinder rules or as class
actions. 31
In 2001, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided American Bankers Co.
v. Alexander,32 in which it explained its broad view of permissive party
joinder. In American Bankers, the court permitted 1371 plaintiffs to join in
five mass actions over excessive insurance premiums. 33 The court acknowl-
edged that it has "taken notice of the unavailability of class actions and has
liberalized the rules of civil procedure at times in order to better accommo-
date parties who are consequentially shut out of the legal system. ' 34 In-
deed, in taking a broad view of party joinder, the court cited the United
States Supreme Court's class action decision in Amchem Products v. Wind-
sor for the value of allowing plaintiffs to "overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights."35 After the American Bankers decision, a
treatise on Mississippi civil procedure observed that "[E]ven though the
Mississippi Supreme Court has never adopted a rule authorizing class ac-
tions, the opinion in the American Bankers case uses Rule 20 to create a
class action in Mississippi."36
Whereas the federal courts and other state courts had used class ac-
tions to handle some mass litigation, the Mississippi courts used expansive
party joinder under Rule 20, combined with judicial discretion under Rule
42 to structure the trial by combining or separating various issues, claims,
and defenses. Until it was amended in 2004, the official comment to Rule
20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure declared a policy of "virtu-
ally unlimited joinder": "The general philosophy of the joinder provisions
of these rules is to allow virtually unlimited joinder at the pleading stage,
but to give the court discretion to shape the trial to the necessities of the
particular case."37
30. See Brian Herrington, Mississippi State Court Class Action Proceedings, 2005 A.B.A. SURv.
ST. CLASS ACnON L. 1 ("[L]iberal joinder of claims and parties under the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 20, furnishes a means for joining claims on a quasi-class basis.").
31. See David W. Clark, Life in Lawsuit Central: An Overview of the Unique Aspects of Missis-
sippi's Civil Justice System, 71 Miss. L.J. 359, 369 (2002).
32. 818 So. 2d 1073 (Miss. 2001), overruled in part by Capital City Ins. Co. v. C.B. "Boots" Smith
Corp., 889 So. 2d 505, 517 (Miss. 2004).
33. Id. at 1074.
34. Id. at 1078. See also Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 773 (Miss.
1994) (expanding the state's mootness doctrine "to fill the gap left open by the unavailability of class
actions in Mississippi").
35. Am. Bankers, 818 So. 2d at 1077-78 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617
(1997)).
36. Pat H. Scanlon, Parties, in Mississippi CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6:20 (Jeffrey Jackson ed., 2004).
37. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20, cmt. (language deleted in 2004). See also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Travis, 808 So.
2d 928, 931 (Miss. 2002) (quoting the official comment), overruled in part by Capital City Ins. Co, 889
So. 2d at 517.
[VOL. 24:285
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In 2004, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court changed direction,
and deleted the sentence about "virtually unlimited joinder" from its offi-
cial comment to Rule 20.38 Three months later, the court amended the
Rule 20 comment to specify that the "transaction or occurrence" prerequi-
site for party joinder "requires that there be a distinct litigable event link-
ing the parties."39 The court also inserted a call for judges to consider
whether individual issues make joinder inappropriate: "If the criteria of
Rule 20 are otherwise met, the court should consider whether different in-
juries, different damages, different defensive postures and other individual-
ized factors will be so dissimilar as to make management of the cases
consolidated under Rule 20 impractical."40
It is interesting that even as the Mississippi Supreme Court veered
away from liberally allowing mass joinder, the new requirements it im-
posed for its joinder rule resemble typical requirements for class certifica-
tion in the federal courts and other state courts. The "individualized
factors" consideration reflects precisely the same concerns as the predomi-
nance 41 and superiority42 requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). The "distinct liti-
gable event" requirement, while stricter than Rule 23(a)'s notions of
commonality 43 and typicality,44 bears a resemblance to those class certifica-
tion prerequisites. Indeed, in the Armond case, Justice Graves wrote a spe-
cial concurrence to suggest that Mississippi's Rule 20 "super-joinder"
should be replaced by a class action rule.45
Before the recent changes, Mississippi's permissive approach to party
joinder combined with other factors to give Mississippi a disproportionate
share of mass litigation. The concentration of mass litigation in Mississippi
was driven in part by liberal joinder and venue rules, and in part by Missis-
sippi's reputation as a favorable forum for plaintiffs. Indeed, in 2002 and
2003, the American Tort Reform Association ("ATRA") listed several
Mississippi counties among the top "judicial hellholes" in the nation.46 The
38. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20, cmt. (as amended Feb. 20, 2004); see also Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v.
Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092 (Miss. 2004).
39. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20, cmt. (as amended Feb. 20, 2004).
40. Id.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ("questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members").
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ("a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy"). The rule lists several matters pertinent to a finding of
superiority, including "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."
FED. R. Civ. P 23(b)(3)(D).
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) ("there are questions of law or fact common to the class").
44. See FED. R. Civ. P 23(a)(3) ("the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class").
45. Armond, 866 So. 2d at 1103-04.
46. American Tort Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellhole, 2004, 10 ("ATRA named Mississippi's
22nd Judicial Circuit, which includes Copiah, Claiborne, and Jefferson Counties, as a Judicial Hellhole
in both 2002 and 2003, with Holmes and Hinds Counties joining the list last year.") (on file with the
Mississippi College Law Review), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
2005]
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ATRA report noted that "[o]ver the past decade, Mississippi became
known as the 'lawsuit capital of the world.' 1 47
Recent tort reform in Mississippi, however, dramatically changed
ATRA's impression of the state. According to ATRA's 2004 Judicial Hel-
lholes Report, "Mississippi is well on its way to judicial - and economic -
recovery. ' 48 The report praised all three branches of Mississippi's govern-
ment for reforms over the past three years that made Mississippi's courts
more hospitable to civil litigation defendants. 49 Among other things, the
report praised the Mississippi Supreme Court's newly restrictive approach
to venue and party joinder: "In five cases over a seven month period be-
tween February and September 2004, the Mississippi Supreme Court re-
peatedly acted to rein in the joining of numerous lawsuits into 'mass
actions' and blatant forum shopping, which brought plaintiffs from around
the nation into Mississippi courts."5 ° As one national legal headline re-
cently put it, "Mississippi No Longer a Mass Tort Haven."51
It remains to be seen how dramatically the recent reforms will affect
case filings. Prior to 2004 Mississippi's courts saw a disproportionate num-
ber of asbestos claims, in particular. According to a 2002 RAND Institute
for Civil Justice study of asbestos litigation, sixty-six percent of asbestos
claims were filed in five states: Mississippi, New York, West Virginia, Ohio,
and Texas.5 2 Another account reported that eighty-five percent of asbestos
claims were filed in ten jurisdictions, led by Mississippi, Texas, and West
Virginia.53 Mass joinder in Mississippi asbestos litigation reached such
mammoth proportions in the Jackson County asbestos trial of 1993 that
pretrial motion proceedings were held at the Jackson County fairgrounds
to accommodate the crowds of attorneys. 54 This consolidated trial of com-
mon issues of law and fact included the claims of over six thousand plain-
tiffs against over one hundred defendants.55
There are plenty of other examples of mass litigation in Mississippi. A
train derailment resulted in a lawsuit with over six hundred plaintiffs.56
47. Id. at 10 (quoting Tim Lemke, Lawyers in Paradise: Mississippi has a Reputation as a Haven
for Trial Lawyers Pursuing Mega-Lawsuits, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Aug. 12, 2002).
48. Id. at 6.
49. See id. at 11.
50. Id.
51. David Hechler, Mississippi No Longer a Mass Tort Haven, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 2005, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105364095734.
52. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN
INTERIM REPORT vi (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB397/DB397.pdf.
53. See Robert J. Samuelson, Asbestos Fraud, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25.
54. Guthrie T. Abbott & Pope S. Mallette, Complex/Mass Tort Litigation in State Courts in Mis-
sissippi, 63 Miss. L.J. 363, 370-71 (1994).
55. Id. See also Clark, supra note 31, at 371 (citing Stephens v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
No. 11-0010 (Cir. Ct. Jasper County, Miss. filed Jan. 30, 2001) (over 2,500 asbestos claimants suing over
100 defendants)).
56. Abbott & Pope, supra note 54, at 368 (citing Hathorn v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., No. 7818 (Cir.
Ct. Jefferson Davis County, Miss., filed Sept. 4, 1992)).
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Mississippi has seen mass litigation over diet drugs, 57 defective tires, 58 in-
surance fraud, 59 and many other matters.
Plaintiffs' lawyers with thriving practices in Mississippi may represent
hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs with related claims. One Columbus,
Mississippi law firm, for example, reported in a newsletter to its clients that
it "currently has over 1,000 asbestos clients, primarily auto mechanics, who
suffered exposure to airborne asbestosis dust while doing brake work."6
The same firm reported a settlement for thousands of Mississippi residents
who lived near a creosote wood treatment plant.61 The 2004 reforms have
made it more difficult to use Mississippi Rule 20 for mass party joinder, but
the business of mass litigation makes it almost certain that lawyers will con-
tinue to represent massive numbers of similarly situated clients, will con-
tinue to handle their claims on a collective basis as a practical matter with
or without formal joinder under Rule 20, and will resolve many of those
claims through aggregate settlements.
Lester Brickman, an outspoken critic of mass tort claims, recently de-
scribed one of the reasons for Mississippi's centrality in mass litigation, and
echoed the concerns of the earlier ATRA reports:
The importance of Mississippi as a jurisdiction where asbes-
tos litigation has reached its highest and most valuable form
is further exhibited by a $160 million settlement in Novem-
ber 1999 with eighteen asbestos defendants involving 4000
plaintiffs from five states. While 2,645 residents of Ohio,
Indiana and Pennsylvania received $14,000 apiece, and
seven Texas plaintiffs received $43,500 apiece, the 246 plain-
tiffs from four 'magic' counties in Mississippi, who claimed
similar injuries, received $263,000 apiece.62
Brickman also describes a 1998 case in Fayette, Mississippi in which
twelve plaintiffs received a $48.5 million compensatory damages verdict,
and after most of the claims were settled pending the punitive damages
57. See, e.g., John H. Beisner et. al., One Small Step for a County Court... One Giant Calamity
for the National Legal System, in CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT, at 19 (Ctr. for Legal Policy at the Manhattan
Inst., No. 7, Apr. 2003), available at http:/www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjr-07.pdf (citing Jefferson
v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., No. 2000-66 (Cir. Ct Jefferson County, Miss. filed May 9, 2000)).
58. See, e.g. id. (citing King v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2001-21 (Cir. Ct. Jefferson County, Miss. filed
Jan. 31, 2001)).
59. See, e.g., id. (citing Barham v. First Family Fin. Servs. Inc., Case No. 2000-166 (Cir. Ct. Jeffer-
son County, Miss. filed Oct. 16, 2000)).
60. Ford and Chrysler Remove Asbestos Cases to Federal Court, COLOM REP. (Colom Law Firm),
Fall 2003, at 1, available at www.colom.com/documents/fa112003.pdf.
61. Optouts Receive Kerr McGee Checks, COLOM REP. (Colom Law Firm), Spring 2004, at 3,
available at http://www.colom.com/documents/spring2004.pdf.
62. Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Be-
tween Scholarship and Reality?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 39-40 n.17 (2004) (internal citations omitted)
(citing Stephen Labaton, Top Asbestos Makers Agree to Settle 2 Large Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2000, at A22).
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verdict, the judge informed the non-settling defendants that he was consid-
ering reconvening the same jury for the remaining 1700 claims.63
Whatever one thinks of the merits of any of these cases, or of the fair-
ness of the verdicts and settlements, one thing is undeniable: the lack of a
class action rule did not insulate Mississippi from mass aggregate litigation.
If in 1981 the Mississippi Supreme Court thought that by avoiding class
actions it could protect its judicial system from the burdens of mass aggre-
gate litigation, the decades since have demonstrated the extent to which
mass litigation thrives even in the absence of class actions. And if the court
thought that by omitting the class action rule it could avoid the sort of"widespread criticism," "sustained attack," and "popular dissatisfaction"
that class actions generate,64 the intervening decades have proved it wrong
with a vengeance, as Mississippi found itself on the receiving end of some
of the most vehement criticisms leveled against any judicial system for per-
ceived abuses in mass litigation.
I. PREFERABILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN APPROPRIATE CASES
If mass aggregate litigation occurs even in the absence of class actions,
then what is the justification for a class action rule? The simplest justifica-
tion for class actions is that in appropriate cases, they can resolve large
numbers of claims more efficiently and consistently than a series of sepa-
rate lawsuits. 65 An even more important answer, however, is that in certain
cases, class actions are more likely to achieve just outcomes than other
modes of formal or informal aggregate litigation. By providing judicial su-
pervision over settlements and fees, offering some assurance of adequate
representation, and enhancing access to the courts, class actions increase
the likelihood that meritorious claims will reach sound outcomes.
A. Judicial Supervision
Because class actions bind non-parties, they are subject to greater judi-
cial supervision than non-class cases. Enhanced judicial supervision may
be the most significant procedural protection that distinguishes class ac-
tions from other litigation.66
First and most importantly, a class action cannot be settled without the
court's approval. The federal rule provides that "[t]he court must approve
63. Id. (citing Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice, FORTrUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at
155).
64. Miss. R. Civ. P. 23 (omitted) cmt.
65. See Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who are the Real Winners?, 56 ME. L.
REv. 223, 224 (2004) ("The class action serves the interests of economy by not having to try the same
issues again and again in separate cases. It also serves the interests of consistency and finality by avoid-
ing inconsistent outcomes in separate trials of similar cases and resolving all claims in a single case.").
66. David Clark notes that critics complain about inadequate judicial supervision of class actions.
Discussing the class certification process, he responds sensibly that some supervision is better than
none: "Currently in Mississippi,... there is virtually no review of the parties or claims before they are
permitted to be joined. Thus, any level of judicial review before certification of a class would provide
more scrutiny than occurs under the current liberal joinder rule." Clark, supra note 31, at 384.
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any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class,"67 and requires notice, 68 a hearing, and a find-
ing that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate. 69 While the de-
tails of a Mississippi rule may vary from the federal model,7" it is fair to
assume, given the nature of representative litigation, that any serious pro-
posal for a Mississippi class action rule must include a requirement of judi-
cial approval of settlements.
The usual justification for requiring judicial approval of class settle-
ments centers on the absence of consent and the agency problems inherent
in representative litigation.7" One court described its task as acting "as a
fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class mem-
bers."7  Unlike ordinary litigants, absent class members are bound by a
settlement even though they did not affirmatively consent to it. In non-
class litigation, the decision whether to settle belongs to the client,73 and
contract law provides the basis for binding parties to a settlement. In class
actions, settlement negotiations are left to class counsel and, at least in the-
ory, class representatives.74 Thus, the argument goes, judicial approval is
needed to ensure that absent class members are treated fairly.
Based on this reasoning, one might conclude that as long as represen-
tative litigation is not permitted, there is no need for judicial approval of
settlements, and thus, the benefit of judicial settlement supervision does
not provide any reason to favor adoption of a class action rule. This would
be incorrect, however. In the absence of a class action rule, lawyers none-
theless reach settlements on a collective basis for numerous clients.75 Non-
class aggregate settlements are subject to ethical requirements of disclosure
and informed consent,76 but in the mass litigation context, disclosure and
consent may not suffice to ensure that clients are treated fairly. No less
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C).
70. For a suggestion of the wisdom of following the federal model, see infra Part IV.
71. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) ("The inquiry appropriate
under Rule 23(e), on the other hand, protects unnamed class members 'from unjust or unfair settle-
ments affecting their rights when the representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudi-
cated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compromise."') (quoting 7B
WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & Proc. § 1797, at 340-341); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac.
Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Rule 23(e) imposes on the trial judge the duty of protecting
absentees, which is executed by the court's assuring the settlement represents adequate compensation
for the release of the class claims."); Grove v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 434, 442 (S.D.
Iowa 2001) ("This task, which the Court undertakes at Part V of this Order, is not taken lightly as a
substantial number of individuals, if the settlement is approved, will be deemed to have surrendered
once and for all their rights for individual redress against the Defendant.").
72. Grunin v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975).
73. See Miss. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.2(a); MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
74. On the small weight sometimes placed on the role of class representatives in settlement, see
Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a court may approve a class settlement
recommended by counsel over the objections of class representatives).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 5-63.
76. See Miss. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.8(g); Model Rule of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.8(g) (2002).
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 297 2004-2005
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
than in the class action setting, lawyers engaged in mass collective repre-
sentation may face an incentive to sell clients' claims short in order to
achieve a substantial and certain payoff in the aggregate,77 as well as incen-
tives to trade off some clients' claims against others.78 This might not be a
problem if most clients exerted significant control over their lawyers, or
were knowledgeable enough about their claims to make informed decisions
about settlements. In mass collective representation, however, clients often
experience little or no individual relationship with their attorney, and exer-
cise little or no meaningful control over the litigation.79 Thus, without a
class action rule, mass disputes are sometimes resolved through aggregate
settlements with, as a practical matter, little involvement by the clients,8"
but without judicial supervision to compensate for the lack of meaningful
client control. Given that mass disputes often end in aggregate settlements
with little meaningful client control and with significant agency risks, the
question is whether it is wise to have no required judicial supervision over
those settlements, or whether the interests of justice are better served in at
least some of those cases by requiring judicial approval.
Attorneys' fees are another area in which class actions provide greater
regulation than non-class litigation. In non-class litigation, lawyers' fees
ordinarily are determined by the contractual agreement between the par-
ties, not by the court.8 ' In class actions, however, the court awards attor-
neys' fees to class counsel.82 Courts that exercise this power responsibly
seek to provide sufficient compensation to reward successful counsel for
their work and to provide adequate incentive for counsel in future class
actions, but not to overpay counsel, taking into account the reduced per-
plaintiff cost of litigating mass cases. In contrast, a lawyer handling mass
non-class litigation receives a full fee - ordinarily a full contingent fee -
from each client. While a full contingent fee may provide appropriate com-
pensation in some high-risk or particularly complex mass cases, there are
77. As the United States Supreme Court reasoned in Ortiz, "In a strictly rational world, plain-
tiffs' counsel would always press for the limit of what the defense would pay. But with an already
enormous fee within counsel's grasp, zeal for the client may relax sooner than it would in a case brought
on behalf of one claimant." Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 853 n.30 (1999).
78. For a discussion of the various client-client and client-lawyer conflicts presented by aggregate
settlements, see Erichson, supra note 6.
79. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 532-39.
80. This is not to say that informed consent is irrelevant or should be abandoned as a require-
ment for aggregate settlements. For an argument that informed consent remains an important protec-
tion in aggregate settlements, see id. at 569-75.
81. An obvious exception is litigation governed by a statutory provision for court-awarded attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h). The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(h), a newly created
subsection in 2003, describes the purpose of the rule:
Fee awards are a powerful influence on the way attorneys initiate, develop, and conclude class
actions . . . . This subdivision is designed to work in tandem with new subdivision (g) on
appointment of class counsel, which may afford an opportunity for the court to provide an
early framework for an eventual fee award, or for monitoring the work of class counsel during
the pendency of the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h), Advisory Committee note.
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other cases in which the economies of mass litigation - and the fee-multi-
plying effect of mass representation - make it reasonable for lawyers to
receive lower fees per plaintiff while still receiving very substantial com-
pensation in the aggregate.83 Thus, another consideration when choosing
whether to adopt a class action rule is the potential for regulating and re-
ducing fees for lawyers engaged in mass representation.
B. Adequacy of Representation
In most settings, clients have little assurance of adequate legal repre-
sentation. Of course, some protection is provided by the fact that lawyers
must gain admission to the bar, and that lawyers are ethically obligated to
provide competent and diligent representation and can be disciplined for
their failure to do so.84 In addition, a lawyer whose work falls below a
minimal standard of care may be subject to malpractice liability if the law-
yer's failure harms the client. Bar admission, professional obligation, and
the threat of discipline or civil liability provide at least some protection
against incompetent legal work, but can hardly be thought to assure clients
of high-quality representation. The market for legal services, in theory,
channels work to lawyers who provide higher quality representation than
others, but most clients lack sufficient information when choosing a lawyer
for the legal services market to operate perfectly. Concerns about ade-
quate representation may be especially acute in the realm of mass litiga-
tion, because plaintiff clients in such litigation often have little interaction
with their lawyers, and lawyers representing numerous similarly situated
claimants face incentives to trade off client interests.
Class actions provide at least some additional assurances of adequate
representation. A court may not certify a class unless it finds that the class
representative and class counsel will adequately represent the interests of
the absent class members.85 This is not merely a requirement of the proce-
dural rule, but a matter of constitutional due process,86 and thus a neces-
sary component of any state class action procedure. Without adequate
representation, class members are not bound by the class judgment or set-
tlement.87 Significantly, the court must concern itself with class counsel's
adequacy not only when deciding a motion for class certification, but
throughout the litigation. One federal appeals court emphasized this point:
"This court has several times commented on the trial court's continuing
83. On approaches courts have used to determine fee awards in class actions, see Third Circuit
Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F.R.D. 340, 356-58 (2002).
84. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 1.1 Competence, R. 1.3 Diligence (2003).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
86. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
40 (1940).
87. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40, Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249, 260 (2d Cir. 2001),
affd in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
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duty to undertake a stringent examination of the adequacy of representa-
tion by the named class representatives and their counsel at all stages of the
litigation. 88
The process of appointing class counsel can provide additional assur-
ance of adequate representation. Under Federal Rule 23, as revised in
2003, "a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel."89 The rule
instructs courts to consider counsel's experience, knowledge, and re-
sources, as well as "the work counsel has done in identifying or investigat-
ing potential claims in the action."9 Some putative class actions do not
involve any competition among lawyers for the position of class counsel
because no one other than the filing attorney seeks the position. In such
cases the court's role is to determine counsel's adequacy.91 If counsel's ex-
perience, knowledge, or resources are inadequate for the task, the court
should decline to appoint that lawyer as counsel for the class9 2 and should
deny class certification on grounds of inadequate representation. 93  In
other cases, multiple adequate lawyers or firms seek to represent the class.
In that event, "the court must appoint the applicant best able to represent
the interests of the class."94 Courts have used various approaches for ap-
pointing class counsel, including bidding processes, with varying success.
While there is always a risk that judges will appoint class counsel for rea-
sons other than the quality of their work, the judicial power to appoint
class counsel, if exercised responsibly, provides an opportunity to provide
some additional assurance of high quality representation in mass litigation.
Finally, despite all their ethical murkiness, 96 class actions provide a
better-defined attorney role than non-class mass collective representation
or informal aggregation. 97 In a class action, the lawyer for the class explic-
itly owes duties to all members of the class, not merely to the class repre-
sentatives. 9 As importantly, class counsel's duty runs to the class as a
whole. The Advisory Committee Note to the most recent set of Federal
88. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th Cir.
1979) (citing McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 1977); Susman v.
Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1977)).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i).
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2)(B) ("When there is one applicant for appointment as class coun-
sel, the court may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1)(B) and
(c).").
92. See id.
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2)(B).
95. See Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F.R.D. 340, 349
(2002).
96. See, e.g., G. Donald Puckett, Note, Peering into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate Attor-
ney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1271, 1291 (1999) ("Although courts
uniformly recognize the existence of these fiduciary duties [owed by class counsel to class members],
they have struggled to define their specific content.").
97. For a more complete discussion of the problem of murky ethics in informally aggregated
litigation, see Erichson, supra note 28, at 417-48.
98. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 1987); Singer v.
AT&T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 690 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
[VOL. 24:285
HeinOnline  -- 24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 300 2004-2005
MISSISSIPPI CLASS ACTIONS
Rule 23 amendments makes this duty explicit: "Appointment as class
counsel means that the primary obligation of counsel is to the class rather
than to any individual members of it."99 In negotiating a settlement, for
example, "class counsel must determine whether seeking the court's ap-
proval of a settlement would be in the best interests of the class as a
whole."'" By contrast, a lawyer representing numerous individual clients
in a non-class setting theoretically owes a duty of loyalty to each client
individually, but as a practical matter would - and should - feel significant
pressure to pursue a litigation strategy and settlement negotiations in the
manner that best advances the collective interests of the group. Elsewhere,
I have advanced the argument that the duties of class action lawyers should
inform our understanding of lawyers' duties in the less-explored realm of
mass collective representation. 10 1 Here, my point is that in appropriate
cases - i.e., in cases suitable for class certification under a reasonably strict
standard - one benefit of class actions is that they present the lawyer with
an explicit duty to advance the collective interests of the group.
C. Small Claims
For mass disputes involving a large number of small claims, only repre-
sentative litigation gives claimants access to justice. Inferior courts such as
small claims court may be unsuitable for the types of problems raised in
mass litigation, and plaintiffs cannot be expected to litigate complex legal
and factual issues pro se. Claims that have negative expected value, after
taking into account the cost of litigating the claims successfully, simply can-
not attract lawyers. Some claims may be too small to litigate individually,
but become economically viable when formally or informally aggregated
with similar claims. Mass collective representation reduces the per-plaintiff
cost of litigating, raises the aggregate stakes for plaintiffs' counsel, and
tends to levels the field with defendants. Such mass representation, even
without a class action, converts some negative expected value claims into
positive expected value claims. Other claims, however, are so small that
they cannot feasibly be pursued with each plaintiff as a named party, even
with the efficiencies of formal or informal non-class aggregation. For such
claims, only the class action can render the claims economically viable.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the value of class
actions as a tool to empower plaintiffs whose claims are too small to war-
rant the filing of non-class lawsuits:
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a
classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of
injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.
Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B) advisory committee's note.
100. Id.
101. See Erichson, supra note 5.
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the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individ-
ual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action
device. 10 2
The Court thus implicitly acknowledged not only the usefulness of
class actions for redressing the injuries of small claimants, but also the reg-
ulatory function of class actions as a means to deter misconduct that might
otherwise escape both the attention of regulatory authorities and the reach
of ordinary litigation.
In sum, class actions have advantages both for litigation that would be
brought anyway and for litigation that otherwise would not be pursued. In
certain situations where claims would be litigated and settled on a mass
collective basis anyway, regardless of the non-existence of class actions,
class actions provide a better mechanism for achieving efficient justice. Ju-
dicial approval of settlements provides at least some protection against in-
adequate settlements and against unfair or collusive trade-offs. Judicial
supervision of counsel fees, similarly, provides at least some protection
against excessive fees that fail to account for the economies of scale of mass
collective representation. Class counsel's duty of loyalty runs to the entire
class, thus avoiding at least some of the ethical murkiness presented by
informal aggregation and non-class mass collective representation. Moreo-
ver, class counsel must be appointed or approved by the court, providing at
least some protection against inadequate representation. None of these
procedural and ethical protections are foolproof, and it is not difficult to
point to class actions in which courts approved questionable settlements, in
which counsel received excessive fees, or in which counsel failed in their
duty to represent the best interests of the class. The question is not
whether class actions are perfect, but whether - in that narrow band of
cases that are suitable for class certification - class actions provide greater
protections than non-class mass litigation, and thus increase the likelihood
of resolving the mass dispute fairly and efficiently.
In other situations, it cannot be said that the claims would be pursued
in the absence of class actions, because the claims are not economically
viable as individual lawsuits or even as claims of individually named plain-
tiffs in formally or informally aggregated non-class litigation. In these situ-
ations, whether class actions provide greater procedural and ethical
protections than non-class litigation is beside the point, because non-class
litigation is not viable. Rather, with regard to these small-claims mass dis-
putes, the question is whether the claimants should have any access to the
102. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). See also Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985):
Modern plaintiff class actions follow the same goals, permitting litigation of a suit involving
common questions when there are too many plaintiffs for proper joinder. Class actions also
may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.
For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plain-
tiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.
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justice system - a question that I hope answers itself. As one newspaper
editorial put it recently, "[t]he ability of ordinary citizens with similar inju-
ries to band together to take on powerful corporate interests by utilizing
the mechanism of class-action lawsuits is one of the shining aspects of the
nation's civil justice system. ' 103
III. CLASS ACTION ADMINISTRATION AND JUDICIAL CAPACITY
A. Administrative Capacity
Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court, when asked why they did
not adopt a class action rule, have responded that the Mississippi judicial
system lacked the capacity to handle class actions. According to former
Chief Justice Armis Hawkins, the court never intended to authorize the
kind of quasi-class-action litigation that later developed under Rule 20.1"
Another former Chief Justice, Lenore Prather, connected the concern ex-
plicitly to the capacity of the courts: "We did riot favor class-action suits
for reasons that it was burdensome, and our courts weren't equipped to
handle them." 105
A state considering adoption of a class action rule understandably may
worry about the burden on its courts, and about the administrative capacity
of the courts to handle class actions, but several responses are in order.
First, the burden on the judicial system may not be as onerous as the court
feared. A RAND Institute for Civil Justice study of class actions found
significant transaction costs in class actions, including legal fees, expenses,
notice, settlement administration, masters, experts, and the time of judges
and other court personnel.1 0 6 Most of these transaction costs, however, are
borne by the parties and their lawyers. The authors noted the difficulty of
obtaining data on the expenditure of judicial resources,'0 7 but explained
that "generally, court costs for civil litigation account for a very small frac-
tion of total transaction costs.' 10 8
Second, many claims asserted in class actions would be asserted any-
way. Without a class action rule, those claims are asserted as multiple indi-
vidual lawsuits, consolidated cases, or party joinder, which Mississippi has
103. Editorial, Class-Action Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at A20.
104. See Jerry Mitchell, Hitting the Jackpot, CLARION-LEDGER, June 17, 2001, at 1A.
105. Id.; see also Clark, supra note 31, at 375 (citing Mitchell, supra note 104):
[T]his result was never intended by the Mississippi Supreme Court when it declined to adopt a
rule allowing class actions. Former Chief Justices Armis Hawkins and Lenore Prather have
both stated that the Supreme Court did not intend for Rule 20 to be used as a substitute for
class action litigation. The goal in not adopting a rule permitting class actions was to avoid the
type of mass litigation that Mississippi courts are now witnessing. Former Chief Justice
Prather stated that the justices wanted to avoid class actions because they are "burdensome,
and our courts [are not] equipped to handle them."
106. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 438 (RAND Corp. 2000) available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MRMr969/.
107. See id. ("Courts generally do not keep detailed records of time spent on specific lawsuits, so
we do not have information about judges' and other court staff's time spent on the cases we studied.").
108. Id. (citing JAMES KAKALIK & NICHOLAS PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION (RAND 1986)).
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experienced in its most extreme form.1" 9 For claims that would be asserted
with or without a class action rule, the class action often provides a more
efficient vehicle for resolving those claims.1 ° Indeed, if in the court's judg-
ment, a class action would not provide a superior means of resolving the
dispute, the court may deny class certification.111
Third, to the extent class claims would not be asserted in the absence
of a class action rule, because the claims are too small individually to be
pursued except through representative litigation, class actions do impose
additional burdens on the court system. Unless the courts abandon the
goal of providing access to justice, however, it is difficult to see the argu-
ment in favor of saving costs by denying court access to plaintiffs with po-
tentially meritorious - and in the aggregate, potentially very significant -
claims.
B. Judicial Legitimacy
In addition to the capacity of the court system to absorb the costs of
time and money to handle class actions as an administrative matter, there is
another question of judicial capacity - the capacity of the courts to be
trusted with the responsibility of supervising class certification, class settle-
ments, and class counsel fees. If judges are untrustworthy or incompetent,
then judicial supervision of settlements, fees, and counsel adds no meaning-
ful protection. Indeed, if judges are untrustworthy or incompetent, the
class action device not only fails to accomplish its intended goals, but pro-
vides an invitation to abuse of power. In the hands of an unscrupulous
judge, a class action rule provides the opportunity to transfer wealth with-
out sound legal basis and to expand the franchise of favored lawyers.
The Mississippi judiciary has received more than its share of criticism,
particularly from business interests. Both the Chamber of Commerce and
the American Tort Reform Association have launched pointed attacks
against the Mississippi courts. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce ranked
Mississippi last among the fifty states in its annual U.S. Chamber Institute
for Legal Reform/Harris State Liability Ranking Study for three consecu-
tive years,112 and ATRA listed multiple Mississippi counties as "judicial
hellholes."' 13 In the past year, however, both organizations have praised
Mississippi for recent legal reforms that left its courts less hostile to corpo-
rate defendants. 114
109. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
110. See supra text accompanying note 65.
111. This assumes that the rule contains a "superiority" requirement along the lines of the federal
rule for money damages class actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
112. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Applauds Mississippi Governor
and Legislature for passing Strong Legal Reform Bill (June 3, 2004) (on file with the Mississippi College
Law Review), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2004/june/04-75.htm.
113. See American Tort Reform Foundation, supra note 46.
114. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 112; American Tort Reform Foundation, supra
note 46.
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Aside from partisan interests in how certain types of cases are decided,
the American Judicature Society ("AJS") has raised more fundamental
concerns about judicial elections in Mississippi. AJS materials on judicial
selection point to large expenditures both by business interests and by trial
lawyer groups, and note that "[t]he 2000 and 2002 judicial elections in Mis-
sissippi gained national attention because of the large amounts of money
spent by both candidates and special interest groups." 1 5 Mississippi's leg-
islature and high court adopted various reforms concerning judicial elec-
tions, most notably the 1999 enactment of limits on campaign
contributions. 1 6 However, according to the AJS, "[t]he campaign finance
regulations enacted in 1999 have had little impact on money in judicial
races." ' 7 In addition to concerns with the way Mississippi judges are se-
lected, some have pointed to problems with how judicial conduct in the
state is monitored."18
Given the concerns that have been raised about Mississippi judges, it
would be surprising not to hear arguments that a class action rule should be
rejected because it would give too much power to the judiciary. But such
arguments, I suggest, are misguided. Suppose critics are correct that some
Mississippi judges ought not to be trusted with the power of class certifica-
tion. First of all, if the point is that not all Mississippi judges are perfect,
the same undoubtedly can be said of every state judiciary as well as the
federal judiciary. Perhaps more to the point, some may contend that the
115. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in Mississippi: An Introduction, at http://
www.ajs.org/jsIMS.htm (last visited). Interestingly, [in 1832, Mississippi became the first state in the
nation to establish popular elections for all judges .... Id. The state switched in 1868 to gubernatorial
appointment with senate confirmation, but reinstated popular elections for judges in 1910 and 1914. Id.
116. See id.
117. American Judicature Society, Mississippi: Judicial Campaigns and Elections, at http://www.
ajs.org/jsfMS-elections.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
In 2000, nine candidates for four seats raised nearly $3.4 million. The 2002 election saw the
most expensive campaign in the state's history for a single seat on the Mississippi Supreme
Court, with three candidates raising nearly $1.7 million. In addition, the 1999 legislation could
not curb independent spending by special interest groups. In 2000, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce spent nearly $1 million on television advertising favoring four Mississippi Supreme
Court candidates. Expenditures by trial lawyer groups brought the total in 'soft' money in the
2000 judicial elections to an estimated $1.5 million.
Id.
118. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 467 (2004) (citing Timothy R.
Brown, Increasing Number of Judges Being Judged in Mississippi Courts, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Jan.
3, 2002, at 5B (reporting on budget shortfalls at the Mississippi judicial commission)).
Perhaps the most intriguing attack on the integrity of the Mississippi judiciary came in a Mississippi
lawyer's defense to a federal prosecution. The indictment charged a state supreme court justice, his
former wife, two former judges, and a prominent lawyer with a judicial bribery scheme in which loans
and gifts were exchanged for influence or favorable rulings. See Adam Liptak, Not From a Grisham
Novel, But One for the Casebook, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,2004, at A14; Jerry Mitchell, FBI Questions Law
Clerks on Rulings in High Court Probe, CLARION-LEDGER, Aug. 29, 2003, at lB. The indictment under-
standably was viewed as a comment on the Mississippi judiciary. In the words of one news report,
"Mississippi justice, the indictment suggests, is built on cozy relationships and fueled by bribes."
Liptak, supra. But even more so, the defense seemed to indict the judicial system by contending,
among other defenses, that the accusations merely reflect common practice. See id. ("A third [defense]
is that what the defendants are accused of doing, everybody does."). The attorney for the lawyer defen-
dant argued that "We're going to need a whole lot more jail cells" because the charges would criminal-
ize what is routine conduct by Mississippi lawyers and judges. Id.
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Mississippi judiciary is particularly unfit for class actions. But a state
should not make procedural policy based on assumptions of fundamental
corruption or incompetence. To establish a public dispute resolution sys-
tem is to assume a basic level of judicial integrity. If that assumption
proves false, then surely the solution is not to create procedural rules that
assume judicial corruption or incompetence, but rather to address the
problem of judicial corruption or incompetence directly.' 1 9
In other words, the fact that not all judges are angels should lead us to
establish appropriate controls over the judiciary; it should not lead us to
abandon the core objective of enabling those judges to resolve disputes
fairly and efficiently. To borrow from Federalist 51:120 If litigants were an-
gels, no judges would be necessary. If judges were angels, no controls on
the judiciary would be necessary. In framing a legal system in which
human judges adjudicate human disputes, the great difficulty lies in setting
up a system that not only enables the judges to handle the disputes, but
also controls the judges themselves.
With that in mind, the task for Mississippi now is to adopt a class ac-
tion rule that provides the benefits of representative litigation in appropri-
ate cases, but that contains sufficient protections against judicial abuse to
ensure that the benefits of the rule outweigh its dangers. A carefully
drafted rule, accompanied by constraints on venue and provisions for inter-
locutory appeal, can address many of the concerns that stand in the way of
adoption of a class action rule for Mississippi. 121
CONCLUSION
Mississippi should adopt a rule permitting class actions in appropriate
cases. Prohibiting class actions does not eliminate mass aggregate litiga-
tion. Rather, it channels mass litigation into other modes of formal and
informal aggregative processes that, in some cases, are decidedly inferior to
class actions.
Certain disputes are by their nature collective. Lawyers naturally
make every effort to handle litigation over such disputes on a collective
basis. Some collective disputes involve massive numbers of claimants, and
in these situations, lawyers generally handle them on a mass collective ba-
sis. In the absence of a rule permitting class actions, or if class certification
proves impossible for other reasons, lawyers find other mechanisms such as
119. The American Judicature Society, for example, has produced substantial reports on ways to
improve judicial selection processes as well as on judicial ethics.
120. See Federalist No. 51 (James Madison):
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
121. In an accompanying article, I offer suggestions on the content of a class action rule for Missis-
sippi, and I offer specific ideas on how to use venue provisions and appeals to mitigate the risk of
judicial abuse. See Howard M. Erichson, Comments on a Class Action Rule for Mississippi, 24 Miss. C.
L. REv. 309 (2005).
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joinder and consolidation for formal aggregation of the claims. Even in the
absence of any formal aggregation, related claims often are handled collec-
tively through informal aggregation mechanisms. Individual lawyers or
firms may represent numerous claimants, and handle the claims on a mass
collective basis. Separate firms may coordinate their efforts and share in-
formation to achieve a similar collective representation across firms. Ulti-
mately, not only are related claims litigated on a collective basis, many of
them are resolved collectively through aggregate settlements.
Thus, the question for Mississippi is not whether there will be mass
aggregate litigation, although the state's recent reforms have reduced the
state's share of it. Rather, the question is whether Mississippi prefers to
permit mass litigation through non-class procedural mechanisms and espe-
cially through mass collective representation by lawyers, or whether it pre-
fers - in appropriate, class-certifiable cases - to enable parties to pursue
representative litigation with judicial supervision. As a matter of both effi-
ciency and justice, I suggest that it makes sense to provide the possibility of
a class action. For those claims that would be asserted with or without a
class action rule, and that in all likelihood would be litigated and settled on
a mass collective basis, it makes sense to give the court the power to moni-
tor the adequacy of counsel, to review the fairness of a settlement, and to
determine an appropriate award of fees. In the absence of a class action
rule, clients' claims in mass disputes often are treated by the lawyers on a
collective basis, but without judicial supervision of representational ade-
quacy, settlement fairness, or fees.
There are, of course, some claims that will be asserted through class
actions that otherwise would not be brought. These are claims that individ-
ually are too small to warrant litigation, but that constitute substantial
claims on a collective basis. To that extent, critics might argue that a class
action rule will impose new burdens on the Mississippi courts, and should
be rejected in the name of judicial economy. But whenever "judicial econ-
omy" is invoked, it is appropriate to ask the obvious question: What are
we saving it for? Saving judicial resources is not an end in itself. The goal
is to provide access to justice as efficiently as possible. It is difficult to see
how that end is advanced by shutting the courthouse door to claimants with
small but potentially meritorious claims.
Are class actions perfect? Of course not. Not every court satisfies its
supervisory obligations, and critics rightly point to examples of unfair set-
tlements in which defendants pay too much, plaintiffs receive too little, or
both. Class actions constrain individual autonomy and impose some bur-
dens on the courts. In designing dispute resolution processes, however,
there is too much at stake to allow the perfect to become the enemy of the
good. 22 Class settlements may be imperfect, and some are genuinely
troubling, but given that mass litigation claims often are resolved through
large-scale aggregate settlements, the question is whether it is preferable to
122. Cf FRANCOIS VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (1764) ("Le mieux est I'ennemi du
bien.").
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have some judicial supervision of settlements or none. Class counsel fees
may be excessive, but given that lawyers who represent numerous clients
often reap efficiency benefits without passing the savings along to their cli-
ents in the form of reduced attorneys' fees, the question is whether it is
preferable to have court-awarded fees or to permit attorneys to charge
each client a full contingent fee. Class actions may deprive some plaintiffs
of individual litigant autonomy, but given how little litigation autonomy
plaintiffs possess even in non-class mass litigation, the question is whether
the slight cost of decreased autonomy is justified by the large gain in access
to justice for those with claims that could not practically be asserted indi-
vidually. Finally, class actions may impose some burdens on the courts, but
the question is whether, all things considered, class actions are more likely
to improve or impair the courts' performance of their core business - the
fair and efficient resolution of disputes. Mass disputes inevitably arise, and
the absence of a class action rule cannot make those disputes disappear; it
certainly has not done so in Mississippi.
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